Architecture
Control plane meets data plane
ActantOS separates policy definition, identity, approvals, and evidence storage from the proxy gateway and isolated executors that enforce decisions in real time.
MVP pipeline
Enforcement decision flow
Pi / MCP Client
|
v
ActantOS Adapter / MCP Gateway
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+-- normalize tool call
+-- canonicalize path / URL / command
+-- attach agent + user + session identity
+-- compute risk class
v
POST /v1/intercept/tool-call
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+-- kill switch check -> deny if active
+-- budget/rate-limit check -> deny if exceeded
+-- Cedar PDP evaluation -> permit / forbid
+-- risk classifier -> approval_required / none
+-- approval state check -> valid / missing / expired
v
Decision: allow / deny / approval_required
|
+-- allow -> Docker sandbox executor
+-- approval_required -> manual approval API
+-- deny -> fail-closed, log reason
v
POST /v1/tool-result
|
v
Postgres Audit Log (hash-chain)Enterprise
Phase 3 target
Hosted Control Plane (Phase 3)
OIDC / SCIM | SIEM Export | WORM Audit Store
Credential Broker | Policy Marketplace | Advanced Approvals
|
v
Hardened Data Plane
+-- gVisor (single-tenant hosted)
+-- Firecracker microVMs (multi-tenant SaaS)Principles
Design foundations
Fail-closed by design
If actantosd or the policy engine is unreachable, adapters hard-fail. No tool call executes without an explicit allow decision.
Out-of-process isolation
Policy runs outside the agent memory space. Prompt injection cannot modify runtime security rules.
Deterministic policy
Authorization uses labels, budget state, approval state, and resource metadata — not LLM judgment.
Immutable evidence
Audit events form a hash chain. Enterprise deployments add S3 Object Lock WORM export for compliance evidence.